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1 Introduction 
Labour market thresholds related to employee productivity and employer 
prejudices translate into substantially lower employment probabilities, working 
hours and job stability for the disabled [4, 27, 29, 32, 40].1 Given the costs 
associated with their unfavourable outcomes – costs at both the individual and 
the societal levels – it is not surprising that integrating the disabled into the labour 
market is a key ambition of many OECD countries [29].  
One instrument used by some countries to tackle the problem of high 
unemployment among the disabled is wage subsidies. Following classical 
economic assumptions, wage subsidies make disabled employment cheaper; 
therefore, one could expect a positive effect of these subsidies on the hiring 
chances of the disabled.2 However, at the same time, employers may perceive 
these subsidies as a signal of lower productivity – they may perceive disabled 
individuals who disclose this entitlement as “severe cases” [11]. 
The empirical evaluation of wage subsidies aimed at integrating the disabled 
into the labour market has received little attention in the economic literature. 
Indeed, we are aware of only two studies in this context. First, Datta Gupta and 
Larsen [10] evaluated the Danish Flexjob scheme, which entitles employers to a 
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 In addition, hourly wages and training opportunities are also lower among disabled 
employees [3, 9, 13, 37, 38]. 
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 Within the classical competitive framework in which wages and employment are formed 
by a confrontation of labour supply and labour demand, wage subsidies will shift out the 
labour demand curve for the targeted workers. This is the case as employers take into 
account the total labour costs when making their hiring decision. In case labour supply is 
infinitely elastic, this subsidy will expand only the employment of the targeted individuals 
without any impact on wages. The lower the labour supply elasticity is, the smaller the 
effect of the subsidy on employment will be and the larger will be its effect on wages [7, 
22]. It is demonstrated that this effect can also be expected based on models with 
moderate wage rigidities, labour market imperfections or structural unemployment [18, 
39]. In general, wage subsidies are aimed at compensating the disadvantage position and 
(thereby) the potentially (perceived) lower productivity of the targeted workers. In that 
respect, wage subsidies for the disabled are quite comparable to subsidies targeted at 
other groups, as theoretically and empirically evaluated by, e.g., Bell et al. [5], Burtless [8], 
Gerfin et al. [16], Jaenichen and Stephan [20] and Kangasharju [21]. 
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subsidy of one-third to two-thirds of the wage they pay to disabled workers. To 
this end, they used variation arising from the introduction of the scheme: the 
labour market outcomes of the target group were compared with those of a 
control group of closely matched ineligible workers. Although Datta Gupta and 
Larsen [10] found a substantial positive employment effect of the scheme, they 
note that they are unsure about whether this effect could be interpreted as 
causal, as subsidised jobs in the analysed period may have been granted to 
relatively “more able” disabled persons. Second, contemporaneous with our 
study, Deuchert and Kauer [11] conducted a field experiment in which disabled 
participants were asked to write (real) application letters to vacancies in 
Switzerland. Entitlement to a training grant (providing a maximum of 180 days of 
full wage subsidy) was randomly disclosed in these applications. Overall, their 
results reveal that this instrument is ineffective. Although the methodology 
applied by these authors is quite innovative, the results they present are not very 
insightful because only 51 individuals participated in the experiment, sending out 
7.5 applications on average, resulting in fixed-effects estimations with very large 
standard errors. 
In our study, we conduct a large-scale field experiment to evaluate the 
effectiveness of wage subsidies in terms of integrating the disabled into the 
labour market. More concretely, we use a correspondence experiment to test 
whether revealing entitlement to a Belgian wage subsidy enhances the likelihood 
of disabled persons receiving a positive response to a job application. Two 
applications for male graduates, identical except that one reveals a disability, are 
sent out to 768 vacancies in the Flemish labour market.3 In addition, we 
randomise over pairs in which the disabled candidate also mentions entitlement 
to a wage subsidy, the Flemish Supporting Subsidy, amounting to between 20% 
and 40% of the total wage cost, and pairs in which the disabled candidate does 
not. Monitoring the subsequent call-back enables us to identify heterogeneity in 
the unequal treatment of disabled and non-disabled applicants by wage subsidy 
entitlement disclosure. In addition, these data allow us to contribute to the 
literature on disability discrimination in general by showing how this 
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 Flanders is the northern, Dutch-speaking part of Belgium. 
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discrimination varies with policy-relevant variables, such as education status, 
application extensiveness, employer characteristics and contract modalities.4 
This article is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe the 
modalities of the Flemish Supporting Subsidy. In Section 3, we provide some 
information on how the experimental data were obtained. Subsequently, in 
Section 4, we present and discuss the statistical analysis of the resulting dataset to 
answer our research question. A final section concludes. 
2 Institutional Context 
In this article, we aim to identify the effect of revealing entitlement to the Flemish 
Supporting Subsidy (FSS) on the hiring chances of disabled individuals. This 
subsidy, granted (and paid) by the Public Employment Agency of Flanders, aims to 
integrate disabled persons into the labour market. Entitlement to this subsidy can 
be claimed by the disabled based on (i) leaving school after special secondary 
education, (ii) the recognition of the disability by the Belgian Federal Public 
Service Social Security, (iii) the judgement by the Flemish Agency for the Disabled 
of their disability as justifying a wage subsidy and (iv) the judgement by the Public 
Employment Agency of their disability as justifying a wage subsidy. The FSS is then 
granted after a meeting with a case worker of the Public Employment Agency at 
which the claim is proven. Consultation with the staff of three Flemish 
organisations supporting disabled people in school and in the labour market (GTB 
Gent vzw, Cursief vzw and UBCO) reveals that the FSS is in principle assigned for 
all serious mental, psychological or physical disabilities. The disabilities revealed in 
our experiment (blindness, deafness or autism) therefore automatically translate 
into eligibility for the FSS. As a consequence, within the context of our 
experiment, being granted the subsidy is in no way a reflection of the severity of 
the disability, as all people suffering from blindness, deafness and autism obtain 
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 During the last two decades, academics have provided evidence for labour market 
discrimination against disabled persons in the United States, Greece, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Scotland, Canada and France [2, 13, 15, 17, 25, 26, 33].  
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the FSS when claimed. 
Employers who recruit a worker granted the FSS can request the wage subsidy 
using an online form at the website of the Public Employment Agency. This 
subsidy is then automatically paid over a five-year period. The amount of the 
premium is calculated based on the salary of the employee and the time elapsed 
since the employee’s recruitment by the employer. During the first five quarters 
of the contract, the subsidy is 40% of the total wage cost (gross wage plus social 
security contributions), upper bounded by twice the average minimum wage in 
Belgium (e.g., 2 × 1502 euro in 2014). From quarter 6 to quarter 9, the subsidy 
amounts 30% of the total wage cost, it is 20% thereafter. 
After the approval of the subsidy, the employer may claim higher percentages 
(up to 60%) of wage subsidy if the employer can successfully argue that the 
standard subsidy does not compensate for the lower productivity of the disabled 
employee.5 After five years, an employer can apply for an extension of another 
five years (with a subsidy of, in principle, 20% of the gross wage) if he can 
successfully argue that the disability of the employee still results in a productivity 
loss. As long as the employee remains employed with the employer under 
concern, this employer can continue to extend the premium. Both increases and 
extensions of the wage subsidy are approved based on the advice of an expert 
sent to the workplace by the Public Employment Agency. 
In sum, the normal process determining the wage subsidy can be thought of 
as five consecutive steps. First, the disabled worker claims eligibility for the FSS at 
the Public Employment Service of Flanders. Second, the Public Employment 
Service grants the FSS after a meeting with a case worker. Third, the disabled 
candidate sends an application to a job posting. Fourth, if the candidate is hired, 
the FSS is requested by the employer and a fixed – but decreasing over time – 
percentage of the gross wage of the worker is automatically paid over a 
(renewable) period of five years. Fifth, an increase of the subsidy might be 
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 As a consequence, after the employee who is assigned the FSS is hired, an additional part 
of the subsidy might relate to the seriousness of the disability, even for blind, deaf and 
autistic people. Because, however, our experiment is focussed on the hiring stage only, 
the size of the subsidy is equal for all (fictitious) candidates included in our study. 
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requested by the employer if (s)he can argue that the FSS does not compensate 
for the lower productivity of the particular worker in the particular job. As an 
alternative to this process, a disabled worker is also able to claim the FSS after 
being hired, after which the mentioned second, fourth and fifth steps are passed 
through. Given the active encouragement by the organisations supporting 
disabled people in school and the labour market to claim the FSS, we learned from 
the contact people of the Public Employment Service of Flanders that this 
alternative path is less frequently taken. 
3 Data 
3.1 Measuring Unequal Treatment by a Correspondence Test 
Correspondence experiments to test for hiring discrimination on such grounds as 
ethnicity, gender, beauty and sexual orientation have been extensively used and 
refined during the last decade [1, 6, 12, 31, 36]. Within these field experiments, 
pairs of fictitious written job applications are sent to real job openings. The two 
applications within each pair are similar except for the single characteristic that is 
to be tested. By monitoring the subsequent call-back, i.e., the reaction from the 
employer side, unequal treatment based on this characteristic can be identified. 
These field experiments have been widely viewed as providing the most 
convincing evidence of unequal treatment in hiring decisions [34]. Without the 
use of such experimental data, researchers possess far less data than employers 
do. Employees that appear similar to researchers based on standard non-
experimental data may look very different to employers. Using a correspondence 
test, selection on the basis of individual unobservable characteristics is eliminated 
because all of the information received by the employer is controlled by the 
researcher. In this way, strict equivalence between fictitious applicants is ensured, 
and employer discrimination is disentangled from alternative explanations of 
differential hiring rates, such as differential employee preferences and network 
effects. 
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Our experiment was conducted from October 2012 to March 2013 in Flanders. 
Two applications, identical except that one revealed a disability, were sent out to 
768 vacancies. Blindness, deafness and autism each represented one-third of the 
disabilities revealed. We selected vacancies for which the disabled candidate 
could be expected, based on the vacancy information, to be as productive as his 
non-disabled counterpart, possibly after reasonable (and fully subsidised) 
adjustments in the workplace. In addition, entitlement to the Flemish Supporting 
Subsidy was randomly disclosed in the applications of the disabled individuals. In 
what follows, we describe the vacancy selection, the construction of the fictitious 
job applications and the monitoring of employers’ reactions. We end with an 
overview of the limitations of our design. 
3.2 Selection of the Vacancies 
All vacancies were taken from the database of the Public Employment Agency of 
Flanders, which is the major job search channel in Flanders. From this database, 
we randomly selected vacancies of private employers requiring no relevant work 
experience and for which the disabled candidates could be expected to be as 
productive as candidates without a disability, possibly subject to limited (and fully 
subsidised) adjustments to the workplace (such as a Braille keyboard for the 
computer, interpreter hours or the accommodation of a guide dog). The 
occupations to which the fictitious applications were sent were chosen after 
consultation of the staff of the three aforementioned Flemish organisations 
supporting disabled people in school and the labour market. 
More concretely, we selected the moderately skilled occupations of 
administrative clerk and teleseller and highly skilled occupations of accountant 
and informatician when one of the candidates was blind. We chose the 
moderately skilled occupations of electrician and carpenter and the highly skilled 
occupations of chemist and informatician when one of the candidates was deaf. 
We lastly chose the moderately skilled occupations of administrative clerk and 
carpenter and the highly skilled occupations of accountant and informatician 
when one of the candidates was autistic. 
We screened the vacancies we found for the aforementioned occupations on 
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elements in the job that lead to a lower productivity for the disabled candidate, 
even in the case of limited adjustments to the workplace. Such vacancies were 
ignored, as in reality the likelihood of the disabled applying for these positions 
seems to be rather small.6 Moreover, had we not ignored these posted jobs, our 
fictitious candidates would certainly not have been comparable to the non-
disabled in terms of productivity-related characteristics. Nevertheless, unequal 
treatment is expected to be more to the disadvantage of disabled candidates 
within the ignored posted jobs. As a result, although we are not able to judge this, 
our measure of unfavourable treatment of the disabled may be interpreted as an 
upper bound for comparable measures based on a completely random selection 
of vacancies.  
3.3 Construction of Fictitious Applications 
We created two template types (Type A and Type B) of resumes and cover letters 
for each of the occupations listed in Section 3.2, matching the general 
requirements of these occupations. The Type A and Type B applications were, at 
the level of the occupation, identical in all job-relevant characteristics but differed 
in inessential details and lay-out. Several example applications of the Public 
Employment Agency of Flanders, with different fonts and layouts, were used and 
calibrated for our purposes to ensure that our applications were realistic and 
representative.  
All fictitious applicants were single males born, living and studying in 
comparable suburbs of Antwerp or Ghent, the two largest cities of Flanders. The 
candidates applying for the moderately skilled (highly skilled) positions were 18 
(21) years old. The candidates for moderately skilled (highly skilled) positions held 
a relevant secondary (tertiary) education certificate, which was equal within each 
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 For instance, job characteristics that, for all three disabilities, led to ignoring the vacancy 
were (i) high requirements concerning communication skills (e.g., a great deal of selling 
contacts with customer), (ii) safety risks being more prominent given the disability (e.g., 
working with toxic fluids for blind people) and (iii) high mobility requirements (e.g., regular 
visits during the day to customers outside the firm). In addition, for the autistic 
candidates, job postings in which flexibility was revealed as a key quality were ignored. 
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pair. All of the Type A and Type B applicants had graduated from the same type of 
school, with a comparable reputation, in June 2012. 
In addition, we added to all applications the following features: Belgian 
nationality, Dutch mother tongue, adequate French and English language skills, 
computer skills and summer employment experience. The cover letters indicated 
a person who was highly motivated and highly organised. For the highly skilled 
candidates, sports club membership and student leadership were also added. We 
lastly appended a fictitious postal address (based on real streets in middle-class 
neighbourhoods) and a date of birth to all applications. The resume and cover 
letter templates are available upon request. 
We sent two applications, one Type A and one Type B, to each selected 
vacancy. For one member of each pair, a disability was revealed. A credible 
mention was composed in collaboration with the three aforementioned Flemish 
organisations supporting disabled people. One third of the disabled candidates 
revealed blindness by means of the following clause in their cover letter: “In view 
of a job interview, I want to report that I am a blind. Therefore, I am always 
accompanied by a guide dog. However, my disability does not make me less 
productive.” In the resume, this clause was repeated, and the technological tools 
used by the disabled applicant were referred to. Another third of the disabled 
candidates revealed deafness by the following clause: “As you can read in my 
resume, I am deaf. Do not let this put you off. I am a very good lip reader, and I 
have learned to find creative solutions in all sorts of situations. During a job 
interview, I will be accompanied by an interpreter.” In the resume, this clause was 
repeated, and fully subsidised interpreter hours were referred to. A last third of 
the disabled candidates revealed autism by the following clause: “In view of a job 
interview, I would like to report that I am a person with autism and thus someone 
who benefits from regularity and structure, but this certainly does not mean that I 
do not love challenge in my work.” In the resume, this clause was repeated. 
In addition, to answer our main research question, half of the disabled 
applicants revealed entitlement to the Flemish Supporting Subsidy. The other half 
of the disabled candidates did not mention any subsidy. More concretely, to 
obtain comparable vacancy characteristics for each half, we alternated, at the 
level of the particular disability and occupation, between pairs in which the 
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disabled candidate did not mention the subsidy and pairs in which the disabled 
candidate mentioned subsidy entitlement. The wage subsidy was revealed using 
the following clause in both the candidate’s cover letter and resume: “In addition, 
my employer is entitled to a FSS. That is, my employer receives a premium from 
the Public Employment Agency every three months. The amount of this 
contribution can be found here: 
http://www.vdab.be/arbeidshandicap/wgvop.shtml”. 
The reader might note that another option would have been to send three 
applications to each vacancy (from a non-disabled candidate, a disabled candidate 
not disclosing wage subsidy entitlement and a disabled candidate disclosing 
subsidy entitlement). In this way, we would have been able to compare the 
impact of revealing entitlement to the Flemish Supporting Subsidy at the 
individual vacancy level. However, we believe that sending three matched 
applications, among which two were from disabled candidates, to the same 
employer would have substantially increased the risk of detection of the 
experiment. Moreover, if the vacancy characteristics are comparable for the cases 
in which the disabled candidate discloses entitlement to the subsidy and those in 
which no subsidy is mentioned, which is by construction the case for an infinite 
sample, we can draw the same conclusions based on our design. We come back to 
this issue at the start of Section 4.3. 
3.4 Measurement of Call-back 
We registered two email addresses and mobile phone numbers: one for the non-
disabled individuals and one for the disabled individuals. All applications were 
sent to the employer by email. To avoid detection, we applied to no more than 
one vacancy from the same employer. 
Call-backs were received by telephone voicemail or email. The content of the 
responses is available upon request. Because we included postal addresses with 
non-existent street numbers in the applications, we could not measure call-back 
by regular mail. However, several human resource managers confirmed that 
employers rarely, if ever, invite job candidates to selection interviews by regular 
mail. To minimise inconvenience to the employers, we immediately declined 
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invitations to job interviews. All call-backs received longer than 30 days after 
sending out the applications were discounted (however, this turned out to be an 
unnecessary restriction because we did not receive any positive call-back after 30 
days). 
In our analysis, we distinguish between two definitions of positive call-back. 
Positive call-back sensu stricto means that the applicant is invited for an interview 
concerning the job for which he applied. Positive call-back sensu lato includes, in 
addition to the former definition, the receipt of an alternative job proposal and 
the request to provide more information or to contact the recruiter. 
3.5 Research Limitations 
Before reporting and discussing the results of our research, we mention four 
limitations of our research design. For an in-depth discussion of the strengths, 
weaknesses and ethical aspects of correspondence tests, we refer to former 
contributions by Bertrand and Mullainathan [6], Pager [30] and Riach and Rich 
[34-35]. 
First, our design can be effective only in demonstrating unequal treatment in 
the initial stage of the selection process. Because we simply measure call-backs 
for first interviews, we cannot translate our research results into divergences in 
job offers, let alone divergences in wages.7 However, Bertrand and Mullainathan 
[6] argue that to the extent that the selection process has even moderate friction, 
one would expect that reduced interview rates would translate into reduced job 
offers and lower earnings. Moreover, several human resource managers 
confirmed that for employers, it is rational to only invite candidates with a 
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 The only method that could be employed to obtain causal measures of unequal 
treatment at later stages we are aware of is audit testing. Audit tests go one step further 
than correspondence tests by sending matched pairs of actors to job invitations. However, 
in the economics literature, this methodology is currently only seldom used. This is 
because it has been criticised on various grounds [19, 34]. The main critique is that audit 
tests suffer from the problem that it might be impossible to find and successfully train 
real-life job applicants so that they really represent a perfect match. In addition, auditors 
might subconsciously or consciously be motivated to prove discrimination and might 
therefore adjust their behaviour accordingly in an interview. 
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substantial probability of being offered the posted job. 
Second, we test for unequal treatment only within the chosen occupations 
and only within the vacancies posted on the VDAB database. It is possible that 
unequal treatment based on disability and wage subsidy entitlement is more (or 
less) apparent in sectors other than those covered and is more (or less) apparent 
among employers who rely on other channels (such as social networks) for filling 
their vacancies. 
Third, although we aimed to select vacancies for which the disabled 
candidates could be expected to be as productive as candidates without a 
disability, the jobs for which these vacancies are posted may still feature tasks for 
which the disabled candidates are less productive. Therefore, unequal treatment 
of disabled candidates might be due to productivity-related factors instead of to 
discrimination. However, it is important to keep in mind that we are especially 
interested in the relationship between discrimination against the disabled 
candidates and wage subsidy entitlement. As this limitation causes, by 
construction, a similar shift in the discrimination measures for applications with 
and without a mentioned subsidy, our main research conclusions remain valid. 
The same is true for the second research limitation. 
Fourth, on the candidate side, we restricted ourselves to young, male 
individuals. It is possible that unequal treatment based on disability is more 
apparent for candidates of a particular gender. Moreover, the notification of 
disability and/or disability in combination with a wage subside may work 
differently for different generations. One would expect that the potential signal of 
lower productivity by mentioning a wage subsidy would be lower for older 
candidates (as they can mention successful employment experiences). 
Fifth, in line with the literature, we give no direct indication of the non-
disabled candidate’s ability. Therefore, the non-disabled applicant in our 
experiment could also be a disabled applicant not disclosing his disability. The 
comparison of “disabled” candidates to “non-disabled” candidates in our 
framework is therefore actually a comparison of “openly disabled” candidates and 
candidates with an unrevealed ability level. As a result, this comparison in fact 
captures the costs associated with disclosing disability. The same reasoning is 
valid when comparing disabled candidates who do and do not mention their 
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entitlement to the Flemish Supporting Subsidy. Moreover, as mentioned at the 
end of Section 2, a disabled worker is also able to claim the FSS after being hired. 
Some of the employers may be aware of this possibility when receiving an 
application from a disabled worker. For these employers, mentioning the FSS by 
the disabled might not have an important effect. As a consequence, the 
“treatment” for which we identify the effect is not FSS eligibility but approval of 
the FSS at the start of the recruitment process. However, as mentioned 
previously, the alternative path of claiming the FSS after being hired is not 
frequently followed. Moreover, due to the application procedure that has to be 
passed through, letting the disabled worker claim the FSS after hiring him will, 
even if the subsidy is granted at that point, result in not having access to the wage 
subsidy for the first months of the contract, and therefore, there will be a financial 
loss as opposed to the situation in which the FSS was assigned prior to the 
disabled worker being hired. 
4 Results 
In this section, we begin by describing our experimentally gathered data and 
providing the reader with some general statistics about unfavourable treatment 
of the fictitious disabled candidates. Thereafter, we answer our main research 
question by means of a statistical examination of these data. We present positive 
call-back rates by disability and subsidy entitlement status for the total sample 
and for some relevant subsamples. We also conduct a regression analysis to 
identify the independent effect of revealing a wage subsidy on the probability of 
positive call-back. The latter analysis allows us to control for application type and 
vacancy fixed effects on the one hand and variables that may correlate with the 
disability and subsidy entitlement status of the fictitious candidates on the other 
hand due to the finite size of our dataset. 
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4.1 Data Description 
Table 1 describes our dataset. Panel A shows that, overall, in 210 of the 768 
vacancies at least one candidate received a positive call-back sensu lato, i.e., any 
positive reaction. In total, 76 cases resulted in an invitation for both the non-
disabled candidate and the disabled candidate, 114 cases in a positive call-back 
for only the non-disabled candidate and 20 for only the disabled candidate. 
The net discrimination rate is then calculated by subtracting the number of 
applications for which the disabled candidate was preferred from the number of 
applications for which the non-disabled candidate was preferred and dividing by 
the number of application pairs in which at least one received a positive call-back. 
The result is a net measure of the number of discriminatory acts a disabled 
applicant could expect to encounter per application for which at least one 
candidate received a positive call-back. Overall, the net discrimination rate is 0.45 
when adopting the broad definition of positive call-back. A standard χ² test of the 
hypothesis that the non-disabled and disabled candidates were treated 
unfavourably equally often is rejected at the 1% significance level. The 
corresponding statistic for the sensu stricto definition of positive call-back, i.e., an 
invitation to a job interview, as presented in Panel B, is 0.47 (also significantly 
different from 0 at the 1% level). 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Based on the information provided in the first columns of Table 1, we can also 
compute an alternative measure for unequal treatment, i.e., the positive call-back 
ratio. This ratio is calculated by dividing the percentage of applications for which 
non-disabled candidates received a positive call-back (24.74% following the sensu 
lato definition,8 14.71% following the sensu stricto definition) by the 
corresponding percentage for disabled candidates (12.50% and 6.90%, 
respectively). The resulting sensu lato positive call-back ratio is 1.98, indicating 
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 24.74% = (76+114)/768. 
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that the non-disabled candidates in our experiment received approximately twice 
as many positive reactions as their disabled counterparts. The sensu stricto 
positive call-back ratio is 2.13. Both ratios are significantly different from 1 at the 
1% significance level. 
Based on these statistics, we conclude that there is evidence of unequal 
treatment against disabled job candidates in the Flemish labour market. However, 
it is unclear whether this unequal treatment can be labelled as discrimination. 
This would be the case if this unequal treatment were not based on productivity-
related arguments to the detriment of the individual disabled candidates. 
Although we only selected vacancies for which, based on the content of the 
vacancy, disabled candidates could be expected to be as productive as non-
disabled candidates, it is still possible that (as not all information about the job is 
posted in the vacancy) the disabled candidates are in fact still less productive than 
their non-disabled counterparts. However, in this case, one could expect 
employers to be honest about this. To check this, we looked into the raw data for 
the reasons employers gave when the non-disabled candidate received a positive 
call-back (in the broad sense) and the disabled candidate did not. We see that 
only in approximately 9% of these situations did the employer act as we would 
expect in the case of no discrimination, namely, mentioning the disability as 
causing lower productivity in the posted job and (therefore) as an argument for 
non-invitation. In 64% of the cases in which the non-disabled was invited and the 
disabled candidate was not, there was no reaction at all. In 3%, there was a 
reaction but no explanation. Other reasons mentioned are a mismatch with the 
job profile (10% of the cases), a lack of experience (9%), the fact that the vacancy 
is already filled (4%) and the distance between the candidate’s living place and the 
workplace (1%). It is clear that the latter reasons are not honest because, by 
construction, the disabled and the non-disabled candidate have the same 
characteristics. 
In Panel C and Panel D of Table 1, the dataset is broken up by whether the 
disabled candidate within the pair of fictitious applications revealed entitlement 
to a wage subsidy. Following either the sensu lato or the sensu stricto definition of 
positive call-back, we obtain net discrimination rates and positive call-back ratios 
that are (slightly) more to the detriment of the disabled when they reveal 
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entitlement to a wage subsidy. These descriptive statistics provide a first 
indication of a non-positive effect for the disabled candidate of revealing a wage 
subsidy when applying for a job. Whether this effect is significantly less than 0 is 
the focus of our main analyses, which are discussed in the next two subsections. 
4.2 Positive Call-back by Disability and Subsidy Entitlement 
Disclosure 
Table 2 and Table 3 present our main research results. In these tables, we 
compare the positive call-back rates (sensu lato and sensu stricto, respectively) for 
non-disabled candidates, disabled candidates not mentioning a wage subsidy and 
disabled candidates mentioning a wage subsidy. We do this using both the total 
dataset and various breakdowns of the dataset by relevant employee and 
employer characteristics. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
In the second column of Table 2 and Table 3, we report the positive call-back 
ratio comparing the non-disabled and disabled candidates regardless of their 
subsidy entitlement disclosure. Based on this column, we conclude that unequal 
treatment to the detriment of disabled candidates is prevalent regardless of the 
candidates’ specific disclosed disability, their education status and the 
extensiveness of their application. Furthermore, we find highly significant 
evidence for unequal treatment in all categories if we break down the 
experimentally gathered data by the job posting agent, the contract type of the 
posted job, the gender of the contact person mentioned in the posted job and the 
distance between the candidate’s living place and the workplace. 
To investigate whether the positive call-back ratios comparing non-disabled 
and disabled significantly differ within Panel B up to Panel H of Table 2 and Table 
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3, we also conducted regression analyses. Within these analyses (one for each 
panel), we regressed positive callback on (i) indicators for the subpopulations 
presented in Table 2 and Table 3 and (ii) these indicators interacted with an 
indicator of disabled candidates.9 F-statistics indicate that positive call-back ratios 
are significantly higher (p < 0.05) when the distance between the candidate’s 
residence and the workplace is substantial as opposed to the situation in which 
this is not the case. Moreover, we obtain weakly significant evidence (p < 0.10) for 
more unequal treatment among the moderately educated than among the highly 
educated. However, these findings may not be interpreted as causal as the sets of 
indicators included in the regressions may correlate across the set level (e.g., 
education level may be correlated with contract status). In Section 4.3 and 
Appendix A, we report on a more thorough regression analysis in which we 
include all of these dimensions together. 
In the fourth and sixth columns of Table 2 and Table 3, we provide the reader 
with the positive call-back ratios based on the call-back rates of the non-disabled 
candidates on one hand and the disabled candidates without and with a wage 
subsidy, respectively, on the other hand. The fourth column shows highly 
significant evidence for unequal treatment between non-disabled candidates and 
disabled candidates without a wage subsidy for almost all breakdowns of the 
dataset. Furthermore, the sixth column shows the same pattern when comparing 
non-disabled candidates and disabled candidates disclosing their entitlement to a 
wage subsidy.10 A first exception to this pattern is the only weakly significantly 
positive call-back ratio sensu stricto comparing the non-disabled with the disabled 
with a wage subsidy for the subdataset of observations gathered from fictitious 
                                                     
9
 For instance, to test whether positive call-back ratios differ by education level, we 
regressed positive call-back on a dummy “highly educated”, an interaction dummy 
“disability x highly educated” and an interaction dummy “disability x moderately 
educated”. 
10
 The reader might be puzzled by the fact that the statistics presented in the fourth and 
sixth columns in Panel A of Table 2 and Table 3 are not the same as those presented in the 
ninth column of Panel C and Panel D of Table 1. This is due to the fact the former statistics 
are obtained by comparing the disabled candidates without or with a wage subsidy with 
all non-disabled candidates (768 individuals), while the latter statistics are obtained by 
only accounting for the non-disabled candidates who applied for the same vacancies as 
the disabled candidates under concern (384 individuals). 
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application pairs for which the disabled candidate revealed blindness as a 
disability. The explanation for the lack of a finding of a positive call-back ratio that 
is highly significantly different from 1 for this group is that for this subset, the 
probability of a positive call-back sensu stricto was very low for both non-disabled 
(0.09) candidates and disabled candidates (0.02 for those revealing no wage 
subsidy and 0.05 for those revealing a subsidy).11 Thus, the standard errors for the 
related positive call-back ratios are quite high. Second, because the fraction of 
vacancies that announced a temporary contract was rather small (14.06%), we 
obtain (higher standard errors and ipso facto) lower levels of significance for the 
positive call-back ratios comparing disabled and non-disabled (with or without 
wage subsidy entitlement disclosure) candidates for this type of vacancy. 
Last and most importantly, in the eighth column of Table 2 and Table 3, we 
compare the call-back chances of a disabled candidate not mentioning a wage 
subsidy and a disabled candidate mentioning a wage subsidy. A positive call-back 
ratio lower (higher) than 1 indicates that those disclosing a (no) entitlement to the 
Flemish Supporting Subsidy are treated favourably. Panel A of both tables shows 
that the positive call-back ratio is 1.00 when using the broad definition of positive 
call-back and 1.30 when using the narrow definition. Neither ratio is significantly 
different from 1, leading us to conclude that neither profile is preferred over the 
other.12 We find the same pattern when inspecting the same statistic for the 
subdatasets except for two observations. First, we obtain statistics that are 
weakly significantly more to the detriment of disabled candidates (not) disclosing 
their entitlement to the wage subsidy if the contact person mentioned in the 
posted job is female (male). Second, we find that those mentioning a wage 
                                                     
11
 As should be clear based on Section 3, we did not randomise over the particular 
disability disclosed due to our aim of selecting occupations for which the disabled 
candidates could be expected to be as productive as the non-disabled candidates. Thus, 
the low positive call-back rates for both the fictitious disabled and non-disabled 
candidates in the pairs comprising a blind candidate seems to only be a reflection of the 
lower positive call-back rates in the occupations (in general or for our profiles of graduates 
in particular) we selected when applying with these pairs (accountant, informatician, 
administrative clerk and teleseller). 
12
 The fact that 1.30 is not significantly different from 1 is related to the low interview 
invitation rate among the disabled candidates (6.90%). 
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subsidy have weakly significantly lower job interview invitation rates for jobs 
offering a temporary contract. This finding can be explained by the fact that these 
contracts are on average rather short, such that beginning the administrative 
process to receive the wage subsidy is not appealing to employers. However, it is 
clear that this statistic is driven by the low number of vacancies posted by an 
interim office in our dataset (10.22% of the vacancies).  
A possible explanation for our main result is, as described by Deuchert and 
Kauer [11], that the financial incentive implied by the Flemish Supporting Subsidy 
is at least offset by the fact that mentioning this subsidy focuses additional 
employer attention on (the severity of) the disability. The wage subsidy may thus 
lead, in other words, to a perception of lower productivity.13 Another explanation, 
suggested by policy-makers confronted with our research results, is employers’ 
fear of red tape. Third, and related to the fifth research limitation mentioned in 
Section 3.5, employers who are aware of the possibility of letting their disabled 
workers claim the FSS after being hired, may not be impressed by the revelation 
of the subsidy in the application. A final explanation is that the labour market 
might be dominated by two types of employers: a first type that is ready to 
consider the hiring of a disabled worker regardless of their wage subsidy 
entitlement and a second type that is not ready to do this. This brings us back to 
the first research limitation mentioned in Section 3.5, as the first type of 
employers might take the potential wage subsidy into account during a later stage 
of the hiring process.  
4.3 Regression Analysis 
As, by construction, we randomised over the disclosure of the entitlement to the 
Flemish Supporting Subsidy by the disabled applicants, regressing positive call-
back at the individual application level on disability and subsidy disclosure on the 
one hand and employer and employee characteristics on the other hand should 
                                                     
13
 The reader will notice that this perception is, in fact, a misperception, as wage subsidy 
entitlement is not related to the severity of the disability, at least for blind, deaf and 
autistic people (see Section 2). 
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lead to the same conclusion for a sample size approaching infinity.14 However, our 
sample size is finite. Thus, some variables that may determine the level of unequal 
treatment of disabled and non-disabled may happen to correlate with the subsidy 
entitlement status of the disabled fictitious candidates. Therefore, we performed 
a regression analysis. However, this analysis, which is reported in Appendix A, 
leads to the same conclusions as those made in the previous subsection. 
5 Conclusion 
In this study, we presented the results of the field experiment we conducted to 
evaluate the effect of wage subsidy entitlement on the hiring chances for the 
disabled. Two applications of graduates, identical except that one revealed a 
disability, were both sent out to 768 vacancies in the Flemish (Belgian) labour 
market. In addition, we randomly disclosed the entitlement to a substantial wage 
subsidy in the applications of the disabled candidates. 
Statistical analyses of our experimentally gathered dataset indicate the 
following. First, when not revealing wage subsidy entitlement, the disabled 
candidate had a 47% lower chance to receive a positive reaction from the 
employer side compared with the non-disabled candidate. Second, when 
revealing wage subsidy entitlement, the disabled candidates had a 49% lower 
chance to receive a positive reaction. The difference between both statistics is not 
significantly different from zero. Thereby, our results show that the likelihood to 
receive a positive response to a job application, being a disabled candidate, is not 
influenced by revealing wage subsidy entitlement in Belgium. Ergo: at least in this 
                                                     
14
 The same is true for an infinite sample if the vacancy characteristics are comparable for 
those vacancies to which we sent a disabled candidate not mentioning a wage subsidy and 
those to which we sent a disabled candidate disclosing wage subsidy entitlement. In our 
case, t-tests show that we cannot reject that the composition of the vacancies is equal 
across these two groups in terms of job posting agent, contract type, gender of the 
contact person mentioned in the vacancy and distance between working place and living 
place.  
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stadium of the recruitment process, this wage subsidy instrument does not sort 
the desired effect. Apparently, the positive financial stimulus implied by the 
subsidy is compensated by signalling effects (subsidies as a signal for lower 
productivity) and the fear of red tape (excessive regulation and formality 
potentially hindering productive action and decision making). Given, however, 
that all of the disabled in our experiment could, based on their particular 
disability, apply for the subsidy on the one hand and that administration duties 
related to the subsidy are very limited, from a policy perspective, we believe that 
investments in a better communication of the limited administrative burden of 
the Flemish Supporting Subsidy are needed. 
An important limitation of our results, as mentioned in Section 3.5, is that 
these results relate only to the first stage of the hiring process. Conditional on 
invitation for a job interview, disabled who disclose their entitlement to a wage 
subsidy may be better off in later stages than disabled who are not granted a 
subsidy because financial considerations might carry more weight then. 
Therefore, we suggest future research on the effectiveness of wage subsidies in 
enhancing the hiring chances for the disabled throughout the total recruitment 
process. In addition, we recommend future research on the impact of wage 
subsidies on mid- and long-term labour market outcomes (such as wages and 
employment duration) of the disabled. However, identifying good control and 
treatment groups for these purposes seems to be only possible based on natural 
experiments. 
Our results complement the recent literature evaluating the causal impact of 
labour market instruments aimed at integrating the disabled into the labour 
market. For instance, recently, Lalive et al. [23] tested the effectiveness of the 
instrument of employment quota in Austria. On the other hand, Lopez Frutos and 
Vall Castello [24] evaluated the impact of disability benefit entitlement in Spain. 
To come to thought-out policy advice, it would be beneficial to have some of 
these studies replicated in other countries. In addition, there is need for an in-
depth synthesis of the (cost-)effectiveness of the different instruments evaluated 
in this recent literature. 
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Appendix A: Regression Analysis 
Table A.1 presents our benchmark regression results. In the benchmark models, 
we regress the probability of positive call-back sensu lato on various sets of key 
and control variables by means of a linear probability model with resume type 
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fixed effects. The control variables are adopted both in interaction with the 
disability status of the candidate and without interaction (except for variables that 
are constant at the resume type level and are therefore controlled by our fixed-
effects estimations or variables that are only relevant for the disabled candidate, 
such as disability type and wage subsidy entitlement disclosure). For reasons of 
comparability of the regression results, except for “disability”, all variables are 
normalised by subtracting their mean among the subpopulation of disabled 
candidates.  
 
TABLE A.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
First, in regression (1), we only include the disability status as an explanatory 
variable. We find that revealing a disability lowers the chance of a positive 
reaction by approximately 12 percentage points. This outcome agrees with the 
difference between the positive call-back rates among disabled and non-disabled 
candidates mentioned in Section 4.1.  
Second, in regression (2), we interact the indicator for disabled individuals 
with an indicator for wage subsidy entitlement disclosure. We find that the 
regression coefficient for this interaction term is a non-significant 0.00, indicating 
that fictitious disabled applicants who disclosed their wage subsidy entitlement 
were as likely to receive a positive reaction from the employer side as disabled 
applicants who did not mention the wage subsidy. 
Third, from regression (3) onwards, we include variables over which wage 
subsidy disclosure is, by construction, perfectly randomised: interaction dummies 
between the particular disability type and occupation for which the candidate 
applied. As a result, the regression coefficients for disability and wage subsidy 
entitlement disclosure are identical to those of regression (2). In addition, we 
observe that unequal treatment is most to the detriment of deaf candidates 
applying for the occupation of informatician and the occupation of electrician and 
autistic candidates applying for the occupation of accountant. 
Fourth, in regression (4), we include variables that could, due to the finite size 
of our sample, correlate with subsidy disclosure: the indicator variables “gender 
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of contact person: female”, “gender of contact person: unknown” and “contract 
type: temporary” on the one hand and the continuous variable “distance between 
living place and workplace” on the other hand. However, this barely affects the 
parameter estimate for the variable of primary interest, i.e., the interaction 
between disability and wage subsidy entitlement disclosure. In addition, based on 
this regression, we find that living far away from the workplace is less penalising 
for disabled candidates.15 
Table A.2 presents the corresponding results using positive call-back sensu 
stricto as an outcome variable. Table A.3 and Table A.4 replicate Table A.1 and 
Table A.2 but introduce vacancy fixed effects. The same pattern of results is 
observed in these three tables concerning the parameters of main interest. 
 
TABLE A.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
TABLE A.3 ABOUT HERE 
 
TABLE A.4 ABOUT HERE 
 
We also test the robustness of our results using a heteroskedastic probit 
model. We do this given Heckman and Siegelman’s [19] critique of previous 
correspondence studies. This critique boils down to the fact that not controlling 
for group differences in the variance of unobservable determinants of positive 
call-back can lead to substantial bias.16 The solution to this problem is, as recently 
                                                     
15
 Further analysis, which is referred to when employing a heteroskedastic probit model 
(see further), indicates that this finding is, at least empirically, driven by the blind 
candidates. For them, mobility might always be an issue, both for small and for long 
distances, so that living close to the workplace is less rewarded. 
16
 To see this more clearly, assume that both the average observed and unobserved 
determinants of productivity are the same for non-disabled candidates, disabled 
candidates mentioning entitlement to a wage subsidy and disabled candidates not 
mentioning a wage subsidy but that the variance of unobservable job-relevant 
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proposed by Neumark [28], to adopt a heteroskedastic probit model, in which the 
variance of the error term is allowed to vary with the minority status of the 
fictitious applicants. We apply this framework in two ways. In a first application of 
Neumark’s [28] econometric framework, we allow the variance of the error term 
to vary with the disability status of the candidates. In a second application, the 
variance of the error term is allowed to vary among three groups: (i) the non-
disabled candidates, (ii) the disabled candidates not mentioning a wage subsidy 
and (iii) the disabled candidates mentioning a wage subsidy. We identify these 
models by assuming that the distance between the residence and the workplace 
has the same effect on the call-back of non-disabled, deaf and autistic candidates, 
leaving the observations for blind candidates out of the estimation because 
deafness and autism do not cause substantial mobility problems (compared to 
being non-disabled), as indicated by the aforementioned Flemish organisations 
supporting disabled people in school and the labour market. The hypothesis that 
the coefficient for this variable is equal across all three groups cannot be rejected 
on the basis of a likelihood ratio test (p-values of 0.20 and 0.38 for positive call-
back sensu lato and sensu stricto, respectively).17 Doing this, however, we find no 
significant difference in the variance of the error term between the two groups 
classified by disability status (p-value of the likelihood ratio test using positive call-
back sensu lato (sensu stricto) as an outcome variable: 0.67 (0.63)) or between 
the three groups classified by disability and wage subsidy status (p-values of 0.82 
and 0.69, respectively). Therefore, this analysis leads to the same conclusions.  
                                                                                                                                       
characteristics is the lowest for the non-disabled candidates. In addition, suppose that the 
employer considers the observed determinants of productivity, inferred from the CV and 
the motivation letter, as relatively low compared with the job requirement. In that case, it 
is rational for the employer to invite the disabled candidate, as, given that the variance of 
unobservable job-relevant characteristics is higher for disabled candidates, it is more likely 
that the sum of observed and unobserved productivity is higher for these workers. A 
correspondence test that detects discrimination against disabled candidates could then 
underestimate the extent of discrimination. 
17
 In addition, if we re-estimate model (4) of Table A.1, Table A.2, Table A.3 and Table A.4 
after leaving out the observations for blind candidates, we find no statistically significant 
effect of the interaction between the candidate’s disability status and the distance 
between the working place and his living place on his probability of positive call-back. 
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Table 1 – Data Description 
Observations Jobs 
Neither candidate 
positive call-back 
Both candidates 
positive call-back 
Only non-disabled 
candidate positive 
call-back 
Only disabled 
candidate positive 
call-back 
Net discrimination 
rate 
χ2 
Positive call-back  
ratio: non-disabled 
versus disabled 
t 
 (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.)     
A. Positive call-back sensu lato: All observations 
All observations 768 558 76 114 20 0.448*** 65.94 1.979*** 8.485 
B. Positive call-back sensu stricto: All observations 
All observations 768 640 38 75 15 0.469*** 40.00 2.132*** 6.490 
C. Positive call-back sensu lato: Heterogeneity by wage subsidy mention by disabled candidate 
No wage subsidy 384 283 40 53 8 0.446*** 31.20 1.938*** 6.016 
Wage subsidy 384 275 36 61 12 0.450*** 32.89 2.021*** 5.986 
D. Positive call-back sensu stricto: Heterogeneity by wage subsidy mention by disabled candidate 
No wage subsidy 384 321 22 33 8 0.397*** 15.24 1.832*** 3.976 
Wage subsidy 384 319 16 42 7 0.538*** 25.00 2.522*** 5.161 
Notes. The net discrimination rate is calculated by subtracting the number of applications for which the disabled candidate was preferred from the number of applications for which the non-
disabled candidate was preferred and dividing by the number of application pairs in which at least one candidate received a positive call-back. The chi-square test for the net discrimination 
rate tests the null hypothesis that both candidates are treated unfavourably equally frequently. The positive call-back ratio is calculated by dividing the percentage of applications for which 
non-disabled candidates received a positive call-back by the corresponding percentage for disabled candidates. The t-test for the positive call-back ratio tests the null hypothesis that the 
probability of a positive answer is the same for candidates from both groups. As two applicants contacted the same firm, the probability of the non-disabled applicant receiving an invitation 
was correlated with the probability of the disabled applicant receiving an invitation. Therefore, the standard errors are corrected for the clustering of the observations at the vacancy level. 
*** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) significance level. 
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Table 2 – Positive Call-back by Disability and Subsidy Entitlement Disclosure (Positive Call-back Ratio, Sensu Lato) 
Observations 
PCR: non-disabled  
versus disabled 
t 
PCR: non-disabled  
versus disabled  
without wage subsidy 
t 
PCR: non-disabled  
versus disabled  
with wage subsidy 
t 
PCR: disabled without  
wage subsidy  
versus disabled  
with wage subsidy 
t 
A. All observations 
All observations 1.979*** 8.485 1.979*** 6.682 1.979*** 6.396 1.000 0.000 
B. Breakdown by the specific disability disclosed by the disabled candidate 
Blindness 2.286*** 4.607 2.667*** 4.225 2.000*** 3.169 0.750 0.681 
Deafness 1.816*** 5.248 1.648*** 3.507 2.023*** 4.582 1.227 0.792 
Autism 2.038*** 4.903 2.208*** 4.204 1.893*** 3.225 0.857 0.412 
C. Breakdown by the education status of both candidates 
Moderately educated 2.407*** 4.970 2.955*** 4.715 2.031*** 3.600 0.688 0.997 
Highly educated 1.812*** 6.995 1.689*** 4.834 1.953*** 5.346 1.156 0.663 
D. Breakdown by the extensiveness of the application 
Limited application 2.000*** 6.200 2.043*** 4.927 1.958*** 4.534 0.958 0.155 
Extensive application  1.959*** 5.807 1.920*** 4.524 2.000*** 4.506 1.042 0.153 
E. Breakdown by the job posting agent 
Firm 1.984*** 7.876 1.921*** 6.041 2.051*** 6.049 1.068 0.313 
Interim office 1.925*** 2.994 2.313*** 2.647 1.667** 2.155 0.721 0.692 
F. Breakdown by the contract type of the posted job 
Permanent contract 2.041*** 7.849 2.085*** 6.432 1.999*** 5.705 0.959 0.191 
Temporary contract 1.773*** 3.290 1.685** 2.288 1.878*** 2.856 1.114 0.281 
G. Breakdown by the gender of the contact person mentioned in the posted job 
Male contact person 1.905*** 5.372 2.620*** 5.621 1.507*** 2.746 0.575* 1.867 
Female contact person 2.043*** 6.112 1.755*** 4.077 2.492*** 5.511 1.420 1.258 
H. Breakdown by the distance (in minutes when driving by car) between the candidate’s living place and the workplace 
30’ of driving or less  1.877*** 5.840 1.985*** 4.928 1.780*** 4.024 0.897 0.429 
More than 30’ of driving 2.114*** 5.850 1.970*** 4.393 2.281*** 4.920 1.158 0.506 
Notes. The positive call-back ratio (PCR) is calculated by dividing the percentage of applications receiving a positive call-back for a first group of candidates by the corresponding percentage 
for a second group of candidates. The t-test for the positive call-back ratio tests the null hypothesis that the probability of a positive answer is the same for candidates from both groups. 
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the vacancy level. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) significance level. The distance between the candidate’s living 
place and the workplace announced in the vacancy is calculated using the online routing tool Mappy.be. 
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Table 3 – Positive Call-back by Disability and Subsidy Entitlement Disclosure (Positive Call-back Ratio, Sensu Stricto) 
Observations 
PCR: non-disabled  
versus disabled 
t 
PCR: non-disabled  
versus disabled  
without wage subsidy 
t 
PCR: non-disabled  
versus disabled  
with wage subsidy 
t 
PCR: disabled without  
wage subsidy  
versus disabled  
with wage subsidy 
t 
A. All observations 
All observations 2.132*** 6.490 1.883*** 4.537 2.457*** 5.809 1.304 0.996 
B. Breakdown by the specific disability disclosed by the disabled candidate 
Blindness 2.444*** 3.207 3.667*** 3.229 1.833* 1.955 0.500 1.016 
Deafness 2.036*** 4.101 1.676*** 2.634 2.591*** 4.070 1.545 1.200 
Autism 2.125*** 4.146 1.700** 2.326 2.833*** 3.916 1.667 1.031 
C. Breakdown by the education status of both candidates 
Moderately educated 2.467*** 3.440 2.643*** 3.203 2.313*** 2.730 0.875 0.263 
Highly educated 2.000*** 5.702 1.652*** 3.292 2.533*** 5.369 1.533 1.367 
D. Breakdown by the extensiveness of the application 
Limited application 2.261*** 4.531 2.167*** 3.500 2.364*** 3.830 1.091 0.215 
Extensive application  2.033*** 4.638 1.694*** 2.929 2.542*** 4.364 1.500 1.140 
E. Breakdown by the job posting agent 
Firm 1.969*** 5.740 1.739*** 3.896 2.273*** 5.081 1.307 0.986 
Interim office 6.256*** 3.175 6.013*** 2.660 6.500*** 3.226 1.081 0.055 
F. Breakdown by the contract type of the posted job 
Permanent contract 2.000*** 5.540 1.905*** 4.172 2.104*** 4.522 1.104 0.348 
Temporary contract 3.000*** 3.456 1.815* 1.815 10.11*** 4.461 5.571* 1.914 
G. Breakdown by the gender of the contact person mentioned in the posted job 
Male contact person 1.923*** 3.973 2.047*** 3.236 1.817*** 2.926 0.887 0.315 
Female contact person 2.200*** 4.651 1.692*** 2.811 3.280*** 4.772 1.939* 1.656 
H. Breakdown by the distance (in minutes when driving by car) between the candidate’s living place and the workplace 
30’ of driving or less  1.870*** 4.004 1.754*** 2.827 2.004*** 3.389 1.143 0.376 
More than 30’ of driving 2.469*** 5.099 2.028*** 3.486 3.155*** 4.945 1.556 1.087 
Notes. The positive call-back ratio (PCR) is calculated by dividing the percentage of applications receiving a positive call-back for a first group of candidates by the corresponding percentage 
for a second group of candidates. The t-test for the positive call-back ratio tests the null hypothesis that the probability of a positive answer is the same for candidates from both groups. 
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the vacancy level. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) significance level. The distance between the candidate’s living 
place and the workplace announced in the vacancy is calculated using the online routing tool Mappy.be. 
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Table A.1 – The Probability of Positive Call-back Sensu Lato: Linear Probability Model with Resume Type Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Disability -0.122*** (0.014) -0.122*** (0.014) -0.122*** (0.014) -0.122*** (0.014) 
Disability × wage subsidy entitlement disclosure  0.000 (0.023) 0.000 (0.023) 0.003 (0.023) 
Disability × gender of contact person: female    -0.023 (0.031) 
Disability × gender of contact person: unknown    -0.004 (0.052) 
Disability × job posting agent: interim office    -0.120 (0.110) 
Disability × contract type: temporary    0.042 (0.083) 
Disability × distance between living place and workplace    0.032** (0.015) 
Disability × blind candidate applying for accountant   -0.047 (0.045) -0.057 (0.047) 
Disability × blind candidate applying for informatician    -0.109* (0.058) -0.110* (0.058) 
Disability × blind candidate applying for administrative clerk    -0.047 (0.050) -0.032 (0.051) 
Disability × blind candidate applying for teleseller   -0.031 (0.056) -0.012 (0.057) 
Disability × deaf candidate applying for chemist   -0.094 (0.065) -0.101 (0.065) 
Disability × deaf candidate applying for informatician   -0.156** (0.062) -0.167*** (0.062) 
Disability × deaf candidate applying for carpenter   -0.047 (0.063) -0.057 (0.064) 
Disability × deaf candidate applying for electrician   -0.141* (0.072) -0.113 (0.071) 
Disability × autistic candidate applying for accountant   -0.141** (0.055) -0.160*** (0.056) 
Disability × autistic candidate applying for informatician   -0.047 (0.059) -0.055 (0.060) 
Disability × autistic candidate applying for administrative clerk   -0.047 (0.045) -0.062 (0.047) 
Gender of contact person: female    0.017 (0.033) 
Gender of contact person: unknown    -0.036 (0.055) 
Job posting agent: interim office    0.069 (0.102) 
Contract type: temporary    0.102 (0.085) 
Distance between living place and workplace    -0.051*** (0.015) 
Resume type fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1536 1536 1536 1536 
Notes. The presented results are linear probability model estimates with standard errors, corrected for clustering at the vacancy level, in parentheses. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at 
the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level. Except for “disability”, all variables are normalised by subtracting their mean among the subpopulation of disabled candidates. The continuous variable “distance 
between living place and workplace” is further normalised by dividing by the standard deviation among the subpopulation of disabled candidates. The distance between the candidate’s living 
place and the workplace announced in the vacancy is calculated using the online routing tool Mappy.be. 
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Table A.2 – The Probability of Positive Call-back Sensu Stricto: Linear Probability Model with Resume Type Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Disability -0.078*** (0.012) -0.078*** (0.012) -0.078*** (0.012) -0.079*** (0.012) 
Disability × wage subsidy entitlement disclosure  -0.018 (0.018) -0.018 (0.018) -0.014 (0.018) 
Disability × gender of contact person: female    -0.012 (0.027) 
Disability × gender of contact person: unknown    -0.020 (0.043) 
Disability × job posting agent: interim office    -0.027 (0.096) 
Disability × contract type: temporary    -0.052 (0.079) 
Disability × distance between living place and workplace    0.027** (0.013) 
Disability × blind candidate applying for accountant   -0.016 (0.041) -0.029 (0.042) 
Disability × blind candidate applying for informatician    -0.047 (0.051) -0.043 (0.050) 
Disability × blind candidate applying for administrative clerk    0.031 (0.031) 0.046 (0.033) 
Disability × blind candidate applying for teleseller   0.016 (0.041) 0.035 (0.040) 
Disability × deaf candidate applying for chemist   -0.063 (0.061) -0.060 (0.062) 
Disability × deaf candidate applying for informatician   -0.078 (0.054) -0.083 (0.054) 
Disability × deaf candidate applying for carpenter   -0.031 (0.059) -0.040 (0.058) 
Disability × deaf candidate applying for electrician   -0.094 (0.072) -0.069 (0.072) 
Disability × autistic candidate applying for accountant   -0.047 (0.046) -0.057 (0.047) 
Disability × autistic candidate applying for informatician   -0.063 (0.047) -0.070 (0.048) 
Disability × autistic candidate applying for administrative clerk   0.016 (0.041) 0.014 (0.044) 
Gender of contact person: female    0.015 (0.027) 
Gender of contact person: unknown    -0.033 (0.043) 
Job posting agent: interim office    -0.123 (0.093) 
Contract type: temporary    0.158* (0.082) 
Distance between living place and workplace    -0.040*** (0.013) 
Resume type fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1536 1536 1536 1536 
Notes. The presented results are linear probability model estimates with standard errors, corrected for clustering at the vacancy level, in parentheses. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at 
the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level. Except for “disability”, all variables are normalised by subtracting their mean among the subpopulation of disabled candidates. The continuous variable “distance 
between living place and workplace” is further normalised by dividing by the standard deviation among the subpopulation of disabled candidates. The distance between the candidate’s living 
place and the workplace announced in the vacancy is calculated using the online routing tool Mappy.be. 
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Table A.3 – The Probability of Positive Call-back Sensu Lato: Linear Probability Model with Vacancy Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Disability -0.122*** (0.014) -0.122*** (0.014) -0.122*** (0.014) -0.122*** (0.014) 
Disability × wage subsidy entitlement disclosure  -0.004 (0.021) -0.004 (0.021) -0.003 (0.021) 
Disability × gender of contact person: female    -0.013 (0.022) 
Disability × gender of contact person: unknown    -0.028 (0.038) 
Disability × job posting agent: interim office    -0.070 (0.080) 
Disability × contract type: temporary    0.095 (0.061) 
Disability × distance between living place and workplace    0.031** (0.015) 
Disability × blind candidate applying for accountant   -0.047 (0.045) -0.049 (0.046) 
Disability × blind candidate applying for informatician    -0.109* (0.058) -0.102* (0.057) 
Disability × blind candidate applying for administrative clerk    -0.047 (0.050) -0.036 (0.051) 
Disability × blind candidate applying for teleseller   -0.031 (0.056) -0.024 (0.056) 
Disability × deaf candidate applying for chemist   -0.094 (0.065) -0.120* (0.065) 
Disability × deaf candidate applying for informatician   -0.156** (0.062) -0.158** (0.062) 
Disability × deaf candidate applying for carpenter   -0.047 (0.063) -0.047 (0.063) 
Disability × deaf candidate applying for electrician   -0.141* (0.072) -0.123* (0.072) 
Disability × autistic candidate applying for accountant   -0.141** (0.055) -0.157*** (0.055) 
Disability × autistic candidate applying for informatician   -0.047 (0.059) -0.042 (0.060) 
Disability × autistic candidate applying for administrative clerk   -0.047 (0.045) -0.058 (0.047) 
Distance between living place and workplace    -0.049*** (0.015) 
Vacancy fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1536 1536 1536 1536 
Notes. The presented results are linear probability model estimates with standard errors, corrected for clustering at the vacancy level, in parentheses. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at 
the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level. Except for “disability”, all variables are normalised by subtracting their mean among the subpopulation of disabled candidates. The continuous variable “distance 
between living place and workplace” is further normalised by dividing by the standard deviation among the subpopulation of disabled candidates. The distance between the candidate’s living 
place and the workplace announced in the vacancy is calculated using the online routing tool Mappy.be. 
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Table A.4 – The Probability of Positive Call-back Sensu Stricto: Linear Probability Model with Vacancy Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Disability -0.078*** (0.012) -0.078*** (0.012) -0.078*** (0.012) -0.078*** (0.012) 
Disability × wage subsidy entitlement disclosure  -0.021 (0.017) -0.021 (0.017) -0.019 (0.017) 
Disability × gender of contact person: female    -0.003 (0.019) 
Disability × gender of contact person: unknown    -0.040 (0.026) 
Disability × job posting agent: interim office    -0.111* (0.067) 
Disability × contract type: temporary    0.054 (0.057) 
Disability × distance between living place and workplace    0.026** (0.012) 
Disability × blind candidate applying for accountant   -0.016 (0.041) -0.025 (0.041) 
Disability × blind candidate applying for informatician    -0.047 (0.051) -0.045 (0.050) 
Disability × blind candidate applying for administrative clerk    0.031 (0.031) 0.041 (0.032) 
Disability × blind candidate applying for teleseller   0.016 (0.041) 0.035 (0.039) 
Disability × deaf candidate applying for chemist   -0.063 (0.061) -0.071 (0.061) 
Disability × deaf candidate applying for informatician   -0.078 (0.054) -0.084 (0.054) 
Disability × deaf candidate applying for carpenter   -0.031 (0.059) -0.037 (0.058) 
Disability × deaf candidate applying for electrician   -0.094 (0.072) -0.074 (0.072) 
Disability × autistic candidate applying for accountant   -0.047 (0.046) -0.062 (0.046) 
Disability × autistic candidate applying for informatician   -0.063 (0.047) -0.066 (0.047) 
Disability × autistic candidate applying for administrative clerk   0.016 (0.041) -0.001 (0.043) 
Distance between living place and workplace    -0.038*** (0.013) 
Vacancy fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1536 1536 1536 1536 
Notes. The presented results are linear probability model estimates with standard errors, corrected for clustering at the vacancy level, in parentheses. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at 
the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level. Except for “disability”, all variables are normalised by subtracting their mean among the subpopulation of disabled candidates. The continuous variable “distance 
between living place and workplace” is further normalised by dividing by the standard deviation among the subpopulation of disabled candidates. The distance between the candidate’s living 
place and the workplace announced in the vacancy is calculated using the online routing tool Mappy.be. 
 
